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  The paper by A. Gaviria et al. uses an econometric model with hedonic 
prices to estimate the value households are willing to pay to avoid crime in 
Bogotá. They find that households living in the highest socioeconomic stratum 
are paying up to 7.2% of their house values to keep their average homicide 
rates constant and households living in the next stratum of richest population 
in the city would be paying up to 2.4% of their house values for the same 
purpose. They write “The result reveals the willingness to pay for security by 
households in Bogotá, and additionally, reveals that a supposed pure public 
good like security, ends up propitiating urban private markets that auction 
security. These markets imply different levels of access to public goods 
among the population, and actually, the exclusion of the poorest”. 
  The purpose of this comment is to build a very simple model to make 
clear what the authors are measuring. The model will also help to point out 
that security is not a pure public good and to understand how inconvenient is 
to treat it as such. 
  Let us assume that the representative inhabitant of Bogotá is a 
quasilinear consumer whose utility function is  s q v u   ) (  where q is the 
quantity demanded of housing (an index of square meters plus living 
equipment) and s is the quantity consumed of all other goods (measured as a 
quantity of money). The price of housing is p, there is a probability   that a 
fraction  A of q is stolen. The probability   depends negatively on the level 
(units) of security per square meter bought x which cost c per unit. The 
consumer problem, whose income ism , is to find the values of q and  x which 
solve 
 
 max.  s q v u   ) (        ( 1 )  
 s.t.  m cxq Aq x s pq     ) (       ( 2 )  
   There is a firm producing housing in a perfect competition market. The 
production cost C depends on the production level. The firm solves  
 
 max.  ) (q C pq B          ( 3 )  
 
forq. 
  There are several settings in which the relationship between consumer 
and firm can be studied. First, I will present the Pareto efficient solution, then 
the private solutions to end with the study of the public good solution. 
  To find the Pareto efficient levels for q and  x the problem  
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must be solved. It is equivalent to find the solution for 
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Equation (7) can be solved for x and then, introducing that value of  x into (8), 
q is found. The Pareto efficient values 
e x  and 
e q  result from (7) and (8). As it 
is usual, they require equalization of marginal cost and marginal revenue –(7)–  
and marginal utility and marginal cost –(8) –. By the way, equation (8) shows 
clearly how harmful for society is crime: marginal cost of production for q 
increases by cx and marginal utility of consumption decreases by A x) (   : both 
supply and demand drop when compared with the case in which crime does 
not exist. 
  In the private solution the firm supplies q and also x as amenities 
(together with qas it is assumed in the paper). The demand function for q is 
obtained from  
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and it is 
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where  
d p  is the reservation price. The supply function for q comes from the 
solution for 
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where 
s p  is the supply price.  Equations (12) and (13) show that demand and 
supply for q depend on amenities provided –x –.  The changes in reservation 
and supply prices for q when the level of amenities changes are derived from 
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I understand that the coefficient  2 a  of equation (1) of the paper measures (14) 
and that it represents the main result reported. Equations (14) and (15) show 




  is higher (lower) than c, the change in the level of 
d p  that consumers are willing to pay for a new unit of security provided as an amenity in housing 
is higher (lower) than the marginal cost that the firm requires to supply it and 
so amenities provided with housing increase (decrease); the process stops 





  . 
Besides, the working of the market forces make 
s d p p   for housing. 
Equations (7) and (8) are satisfied and the market solution is Pareto efficient. 
Security supplied as a private good (in the form of amenities) together with 
housing is efficient. 
  In the “public good setting” security is supplied by a public agency 
financed by a tax levied on housing values in such a way that  cxq tpq   where 
t is the tax rate. The Pareto solution in this case must satisfy 
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and 
e x  and 
e q  solve the problem. But those are not the private solutions. 
Private solutions are obtained from 
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which requires that 
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for the consumer. The firm solves 
 





p  . The public agency chooses t to fulfill (18). The problem is 
posed by the demand for  x  as shown in (21). The consumer faces a flat t  and e x  
 
A x) (   
x c
so asks for a maximum level of x: that level for which an increase in security 
supplied no longer reduces the probability of suffering a crime so that 0  
dx
d . 
The problem is illustrated in the following picture.  The efficient level for x is 
also the level which minimizes social cost CS  
 
 min.  A x cx CS ) (          ( 2 3 )  
 





dCS   is satisfied by 
e x .  
 
 






















In the picturecx ,  A x) (   and its sum CS are drawn. The point for which 
0 
dx
d  implies a much higher demand for security levels than
e x . The private 
solution for the “public good setting” is not Pareto efficient, even if
e cx tp  , 
because it divorces quantities from prices. On top of that, the consumer feels 
he gets a lower level of security than that he is paying for. The use of quasilinear preferences does not allow exploring income and 
wealth effects that are important in the paper but assuming that  A is higher for 





higher for richer agents. 
The important conclusion that can be added to the paper is that security 
is not a public good and should not be treated as such. It is a private good 
publicly supplied because it has important externalities both positive and 
negative: a policeman in front of a house discourages crime in the whole block 
and a private guard in front of the same house displaces crime from it to other 
houses (perhaps in the same block). But, at the same time, private investment 
in security by agents belonging to the richer stratum allows public policy 
makers to displace public security expenditures from richer neighborhoods to 
poorer ones. The problem is not amenities but public policy. In fact the paper 
supports this conclusion when it says “…propitiating urban private markets 
that auction security. These markets imply different levels of access to public 
goods among the population, and actually, the exclusion of the poorest.” 




       
 
 
 
 
  
 
  
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 